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WHAT CAN A BABYLONIAN KING TEACH US ABOUT
REGULATING MARRIAGE?

King Hammurabi of Babylon watches every argument before
the United States Supreme Court. Overlooking the Justices, he
stands in bas-relief along the South Wall Frieze between Menes (c.
3200 B.C.), “the First King of the first dynasty in Egypt” and
Moses (c. 1300s B.C.), a spiritual leader and law-giver.1 Also along
the South Wall Frieze stand Solomon (c. 900s B.C.), Lycurgus (c.
800 B.C.), Solon (c. 638-558 B.C.), Draco (c. 600s B.C.), Confucius
(551-478 B.C.), and Octavian (63 B.C.-14 A.D.).2 Across the aisle,
history moves forward with Justinian (c. 483-565), Muhammad (c.
570-632), Charlemagne (c. 742-814), King John (1166-1216), Louis
IX (c. 1214-1270), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), William Blackstone
(1723-1780), John Marshall (1755-1835), and Napoleon (17691821).3 These bas-relief sculptures illustrate that the Supreme
Court is merely one link in a chain of attempts to apply
jurisprudence as a salve to societies’ maladies. That the Supreme
Court adjudicates disputes according to the rule of law—just as
many of the aforementioned figures did in their own time—is a
testament to the law’s enduring utility.
Like the law, the institution of marriage also stands as an
enduring solution to societies’ problems. For individuals, marriage
fulfills biological, economic, and emotional needs. For society,
marriage serves as a social unit upon which other institutions are
built. The fact that for millennia people throughout the world have
ordered their lives around marriage is a testament to its enduring
utility, notwithstanding a lack of figureheads and a bas-relief
memorial in a federal building.
The rule of law and the institution of marriage are like
everything that people create: they are solutions to problems.
Every enduring idea—from traditions to constitutions to
technology—is a solution to a problem, lacking intrinsic
significance outside of human experience and arising from novel
origins. For example, the idea of “marriage” was a novelty before it
became an enduring institution that cemented itself into human
society.4 Likewise, the idea of “law” was once novel. As Eugen
1. Courtroom Friezes: North and South Walls 1 (Feb. 1, 2013),
http://www.slideshare.net/teddecorte/supreme-court-north-and-south-walls.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. “Marriage is a social invention, unique to humans.” STEPHANIE
COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY 34 (2005). Even if one ascribes a divine origin
to the institution of marriage, one can accept that marriage was created to
serve ends. Id. For example, Genesis offers two possible problems that
marriage could solve. First, God made “male and female” and commands them
to “[b]e fruitful and multiply”—implying a procreative dimension. Genesis
1:28. Second, God established marriage as a cure for a lack of companionship,
stating: “It is not good that man should be alone; I will make him a helper as
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Ehrlich explains:
The Legal Provision is thus dependent upon society both for its
existence and for its content. It cannot come into existence until
there are present in society the institutions to which it pertains, and
it takes its content from the decision of conflicts of interests which
come up in society and which for the most part have already found
judicial solutions. Likewise a law is generally first promulgated
after the conflicts of interests in society have become so sharp that
state interference becomes inevitable. The Legal Provision is
applicable, on the other hand, only so far and so long as its
presuppositions endure in society. If the conditions for which it is
relevant fall away, if the conflicts of interest to which it pertains do
not repeat themselves, then the Legal Provision becomes a dead
letter even if it is not expressly repealed.5

Thus, to consider a “dead letter” is to consider the
presuppositions of the society that wrote the letter.6
This Article examines one such “dead letter.” Hammurabi
earned his prominent place in the history of jurisprudence7 after
he had a code of law—frequently referred to as the “Code of
Hammurabi”—carved into stone steles that he displayed in the
city-states that he conquered.8 The Code governs all manners of
Mesopotamian life, including the institution of marriage. Thus, as
his partner.” Genesis 2:18. From a secular viewpoint, “[t]here is evidence that
marriage . . . existed even in pre-literate societies, and was controlled by
custom and ministered by the individual. Id. As custom grew into law, states
gradually began to exert control over individual freedom to marry and
divorce.” Divorce: Living Apart Statutes as a Replacement for Fault, 1959
WASH. U. L. Q. 189, 190-91 (1959) (citations omitted).
5. Eugen Ehrlich and Nathan Isaacs, The Sociology of Law, 36 HARV. L.
REV. 130, 142 (1922-1923) (emphasis added); see also JOHN SASSOON, ANCIENT
LAWS & MODERN PROBLEMS 26 (2005) (stating that “[m]ost laws probably
started as court decisions and the ones that survived were those that worked.
We can surmise that stone age laws and, indeed, government must have been
appropriate to the conditions and problems of the societies they served.”).
6. See SASSOON, supra note 4, at 14 (describing that “[t]hese laws [of the
ancient world] reveal how our predecessors coped with many situations that
still baffle us . . . Their laws also throw a dim but fascinating light on
prehistoric societies where most of their problems and some of their laws
originated.”).
7. See Owen B. Jenkins, The Code of Hammurabi, Compared with
American Law, 39 AM. L. REV. 330 (1905) (stating “[c]ompiled at a time
regarded as the dawn of civilization but now seen to have been the successor of
long ages of human endeavor, the code by its astonishing comprehensiveness,
wisdom and equitable direction, is destined to rank its sponsor, hitherto
unknown for the most part of recorded time, among the darlings of the
world.”).
8. MARC VAN DE MIEROOP, KING HAMMURABI OF BABYLON 100, 122
(2005); JEAN BOTTÉRO, MESOPOTAMIA: WRITINGS, REASONING, AND THE GODS
165 (Zainab Bahrani & Marc Van De Mieroop trans., 1992). One of these steles
is preserved in the Lourve museum in Paris, France. Erwin J. Urch, The Law
Code of Hammurabi, 15 A.B.A. J. 437, 438 (1929).
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an “artifact,”9 the Code of Hammurabi can be used to examine the
presuppositions that Mesopotamians had about law and marriage,
and their respective utility. Although the Code of Hammurabi’s
marriage edicts are an elegant monument to a brilliant ruler’s
problem solving, the edicts also reflect Hammurabi’s outmoded
and sexist assumptions. The Code’s duality stems from the fact
that, in order to use marriage and law to solve the problems of his
day, Hammurabi was forced to make assumptions about the
dynamics of the spousal relationship.
With all of the aforementioned in mind, Section II of this
Article places the Code of Hammurabi within context by briefly
discussing Mesopotamian history and culture, and more
thoroughly discussing Mesopotamian jurisprudence and the Code
of Hammurabi. Section III presents Hammurabi’s legal framework
for governing marriage, organized around the problems that
Hammurabi’s marriage edicts aimed to solve. Section III will also
provide illustrations supporting this Article’s underlying
contention: a law regulating marriage—whether it be in the Code
of Hammurabi or the United States Code—should be judged on its
ability to solve problems as well as its presuppositions concerning
the spousal relationship.
II. MESOPOTAMIAN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE
Understanding laws and the problems they were designed to
solve requires understanding the context within which the laws
were created. For a law to be a solution to a problem there must be
an institution that empowers the law.10 A law is only a solution to
the extent that it carries the persuasive authority (or rhetorical
significance) of the political scheme that created and enforces it.11
The political scheme in turn reflects the society it governs.12
Thus, prior to discussing the Code of Hammurabi, one must
briefly consider the Code’s context—Hammurabi’s Mesopotamia,
including its history, political structure, social structures, norms,
and jurisprudence.
A. Ancient Mesopotamian History
“Mesopotamia” describes “the land between the rivers Tigris
and Euphrates.”13 Today, Hammurabi’s Mesopotamia encompasses
9. See Martha T. Roth, Mesopotamian Legal Traditions and the Laws of
Hammurabi, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13, 14 (1995-1996) (stating that “the Laws
of Hammurabi, in particular, is a historical artifact, operating in and through
time and space in distinctive and measured ways.”).
10. See SASSOON, supra note 4, at 26.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. NICHOLAS POSTGATE, EARLY MESOPOTAMIA: SOCIETY AND ECONOMY AT
THE DAWN OF HISTORY 3 (2004); ROLLIN CHAMBLIS, SOCIAL THOUGHT: FROM
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Iran, Iraq, and Syria.14 Although the region was inhabited since
5000 B.C.,15 the Sumerians built the first cities in the region
sometime before 3000 B.C.16
The transformation from nomadic settlements to Sumerian
city-states was an experiment.17 This new form of organization, no
doubt, solved problems of nomadic existence, but inexperience
translated into frailty. Once city-states defined their boundaries
and resources, war became a significant problem.18 Like most
civilizations, the Sumerians are not known for their attempts to
solve the problem of war.19 Rather, they addressed the problemquestion: how do we win wars?
Victories needed architects. Therefore, the Sumerians
ordained temporary kings or “big m[en]” to organize their
conflicts.20 “But as conflict bred conflict, and war bred war,
kingship lost its transitory character and became hereditary [and]
dynastic.”21 And, whether driven by ambition or seeking to
assuage the fear of threatening city-states, these kings battled to
dominate Mesopotamia. Around 1792 B.C., the Assyrians
relinquished their reign to Hammurabi, King of the city-state of
Babylon.22
Hammurabi, his army, and his ambition crafted an empire in
four years,23 which he ruled for ten.24 The empire stretched “from
Nineveh to the Persian Gulf, and embraced a territory slightly
HAMMURABI TO COMTE 13 (1954).
14. Geography,
MESOPOTAMIA,
http://www.mesopotamia.co.uk/geography/explore/exp_set.html (last visited
Jan. 18, 2007).
15. See J.N. POSTGATE, EARLY MESOPOTAMIA: SOCIETY AND ECONOMY AT
THE DAWN OF HISTORY 23 (1992) (describing “first permanent agricultural
settlements” as being established around 5000 B.C.).
16. See KAREN RHEA NEMET-NEJAT, DAILY LIFE IN ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA
14 (1998) (stating the Sumerians arrived in Mesopotamia about 3100 B.C.).
17. MARC VAN DE MIEROOP, THE ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIAN CITY 23 (1999).
18. MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 2.
19. See NEMET-NEJAT, supra note 16, at 20 (explaining that “[e]arly
Dynastic inscriptions were full of references to battles between city-states. The
massive walls built by most Sumerian cities suggest a strong secular authority
ready for military action.”).
20. SAMUEL NOAH KRAMER, FROM THE POETRY OF SUMER: CREATION,
GLORIFICATION, ADORATION 57 (1979); see also BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 138
(describing a Mesopotamian ritual symbolizing a king’s victory in war).
Hammurabi, however, actually ended the practice of kings being called “big
men” and adopted a title closer to “farmer.” NEMET-NEJAT, supra note 16, at
217.
21. KRAMER, supra note 20, at 57.
22. MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 1; MICHAEL ROAF, CULTURAL ATLAS OF
MESOPOTAMIA AND THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 121 (1990) (citing King
Hammurabi’s reign as 1792 to 1750 B.C.); NEMET-NEJAT, supra note 16, at 30.
23. MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 79.
24. Id. at 12.
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larger than Italy.”25 Despite its vast expanse, Hammurabi’s empire
had no name and most of his subjects ascribed their allegiance to
the nearest city-state.26 Although Hammurabi was an experienced
leader—having ruled Babylon for over thirty years before
beginning his empire-building campaign27—his sustained
unification of Mesopotamian city-states was only possible because
generations of kings before him disseminated common seeds of
culture throughout the region.28
Written language was perhaps the most important seed of
culture. The Sumerians invented writing between 3300 and 3000
B.C.29 The capacity to record information solved many problems
within Mesopotamian society.30 Writing preserved transactions,
accounts, contracts of business and marriages,31 and
entertainment, such as the epic of Gilgamesh.32
Although there was a common seed of religion in
Mesopotamia, religion was unrelated to law and marriage. Most
city-states “honored the same pantheon of gods,”33 with each citystate having its own god to which it owed specific allegiance.34
Like their later Greek and Roman counterparts, Mesopotamian
deities engaged in melodrama and “had wives, concubines, and
mistresses, and . . . used their sexual capacities generously and
with great cheerfulness.”35 But, “there was no credence whatsoever
in an afterlife where accounts of behavior on earth were settled”
and the religious precepts neither represented “moral ideal[s], nor
even a simple hierarchy of values of behavior.”36 Although there
25. CHILPERIC EDWARDS, THE HAMMURABI CODE AND THE SINAITIC
LEGISLATION 87 (Watts & Co. 1904). Hammurabi’s reign can also be
understood as encompassing all of the “Fertile Crescent.” Urch, supra note 8,
at 437.
26. MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 79. These city-states were diverse. “There is
no such thing as the Mesopotamian city, as each one of the hundreds that
existed had its own peculiarities.” MIEROOP, supra note 18, at 5.
Unfortunately, the confines of an article demand some generalizations.
27. MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 79.
28. See CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 15 (stating that “the art, science,
literature, and legal traditions of ancient Sumeria provided the cultural
heritage upon which Babylonian civilization developed.”).
29. Id. at 14; NEMET-NEJAT, supra note 16, at 47.
30. Frank L. Fetzer, The Code of Hammurabi—The Oldest Known Legal
Code, 35 COM. L.J. 726, 727 (1930).
31. CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 27.
32. POSTGATE, supra note 15, at 66-70; see also NEMET-NEJAT, supra note
16, at 305 (stating that “[t]he people of ancient Mesopotamia were the first to
develop writing, which was triggered by economic necessity.”).
33. MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 79. At the same time, there was religious
diversity due to the distinction between the Sumerian’s religious practices and
the Babylonians Semitic beliefs. CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 37.
34. MIEROOP, supra note 18, at 46.
35. BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 188.
36. Id.
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was no divine moral code, the gods were thought to punish
sacrilege. Mesopotamians superstitiously viewed “unexpected
events, abnormal conjectures, and unusual encounters” as
“warnings, ‘signs’ through which the gods, organizers of the world
and directors of the way things evolve, let their decisions
regarding the fate of mankind be foreseen.”37
The complex economic endeavors in the city-states were
another common seed. Mesopotamians were highly materialistic.38
The professions at the time included merchants, herdsman,
scribes, weavers, moneylenders, dyers, cobblers, smiths,
veterinarians, stonecutters, vintners, and physicians.39 The rivers
and network of city-states created robust trade:
Boats laden with goods moved along the major canals; caravans
passed in and out of the city gate . . . Marketplaces both within and
without the city walls were maintained for the exchange or sale of
goods; and the wine shop, presided over usually if not always by
women, provided a place to visit with friends and perhaps to haggle
over prices.40

Prices and wages were centrally planned.41 Wealth could be
accumulated and distributed to heirs.42
Finally, Mesopotamia was a class-ordered society.43 There
were three classes: the wealthy, commoners, and slaves.44
Unsurprisingly, an individual’s privileges and responsibilities
varied according to his or her class.45
B. Mesopotamia’s Marriage Norms
Written language, religion, economics, and class stratification
are apparent in the cultural norms of marriage in Mesopotamia as
well as in the Code of Hammurabi. To be sure, Hammurabi did not
invent law, marriage, or the laws of marriage.46 Mesopotamians
coupled long before a Babylonian king memorialized his thoughts
about matrimony in cuneiform script on a 2.25 meter phallicshaped stele of diorite.47 Like all Mesopotamians of his era,
Hammurabi likely understood the institution of marriage as a

37. Id. at 141; see e.g., NEMET-NEJAT, supra note 16, at 130 (describing
how “[m]alformed babies were considered evil omens.”).
38. Id. at 27.
39. CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 28.
40. Id. at 28.
41. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §§273-74 (L. W. King Trans., 1910).
42. Id. §165.
43. EDWARDS, supra note 25, at 88-89 (describing classes).
44. CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 29; Fetzer, supra note 30, at 727.
45. CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 29.
46. See COONTZ, supra note 4, 26 (noting that anthropologists believe that
marriage is “universally subject to rules.”).
47. G.R. DRIVER & JOHN C. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 28 (1952).
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legal union, between a man and a woman, with a reproductive
purpose.48 But, this definition should not be confused with the
definitions of marriage argued about today.
First, it does not appear that in Mesopotamia “homosexual
relations were condemned in the least.”49 Artifacts from the period
refer to masters using their slaves as “catamites” and consensual
homosexual relationships among individuals of the same social
class.50 Nonetheless, a Mesopotamian’s sense of justice—i.e., a
person’s destiny within society and nature51—dictated that if a
male did not marry and produce offspring then he was “inferior to
himself, abnormal and devoted to an existence that was different
from other men, more difficult and less magnificent.”52 Thus,
justice dictated that marriage was a heterosexual endeavor.
Second, marriage was monogamous-ish.53 Both the Code of
Hammurabi “and court proceedings indicate that only under
exceptional circumstances was a man permitted to have more than
one wife at the same time.”54 One exceptional circumstance was if
you were a king. Hammurabi likely had several wives and a
substantial harem even before his empire-building campaign.55 He
48. See CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 32 (stating that “[t]here is little
information about the intimate experiences of courtship, marriage, and family
life.”).
49. See BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 190-191 (finding that “[t]here is nothing
that allows us to think that these homosexual relations were condemned in
the least, or even simply considered to be, as such, more ignominious than
heterosexual relations, or that they would be discouraged.”); see id. at 190
(discussing female prostitutes engaged in the same activities); see also NEMETNEJAT, supra note 16, at 139 (stating that “[m]ale homosexuality was
described from the third millennium BCE onward in Mesopotamia. Texts
referred to sodomy between men as well as between men and boys. The
Babylonians did not condemn this practice. But male prostitutes were either
despised or considered laughable.”).
50. BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 191.
51. See infra §II.C.1.
52. BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 196.
53. See POSTGATE, supra note 15, at 106 (finding that the predominant
relationship was “one man, one wife.”); see also RUSS VERSTEEG, LAW IN THE
ANCIENT WORLD 46-47 (2002) (stating that “one wife was the norm and
economic reality throughout most of Mesopotamian history.”); Leon R.
Yankwich, The Cultural Background and Some of the Social Phases of the
Code of Hammurabi, 4 S. CAL. L. REV. 20, 31 (1930-1931); NEMET-NEJAT,
supra note 16, at 132 (finding that “[g]enerally, marriage was monogamous,
even among the gods.”); CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 33 (stating that
“marriage was the custom, and monogamy the most common practice, but
celibacy and polygamy were both permitted.”)
54. NEMET-NEJAT, supra note 16, at 136; see also CYRUS H. GORDON,
HAMMURABI’S CODE: QUAINT OR FORWARD-LOOKING 12 (1960) (finding that “a
wife represented a valuable economic asset, for which a man had to make a
financial investment. It is unlikely that the average man could afford to buy a
second wife.”).
55. POSTGATE, supra note 15, at 148-49; see also NEMET-NEJAT, supra note
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probably gained more wives with each conquered city-state,
consistent with the custom of the period.56 But, for men who were
not kings, monogamy only applied to the marital relationship. Men
were allowed concubines57 and homosexual partners in addition to
their wives.58
Third, Mesopotamian marriages were formed by contract.59
The parties to the contract were typically the bridegroom and the
bride’s father.60 The contracts memorialized the parties to the
marriage, the names of the fathers, and the fact that marriage
oaths were taken.61
Finally, it is assumed that Mesopotamians viewed children as
a blessing of marriage.62 A Mesopotamian woman’s primary virtue
was her reproductive capacity63 and she likely believed that she
16, at 219 (discussing a king’s multiple wives).
56. See MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 112 (finding that “a conqueror would
take over the women attached to the palace of the king he defeated.”).
57. See James Bronson Reynolds, Sex Morals and the Law in Ancient Egypt
and Babylon, 5 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 20, 27 (May 1914 to
March 1915) (explaining that “a concubine was a woman who cohabited with a
man without the legal or social standing of a wife.”).
58. BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 187.
59. EDWARDS, supra note 25, at 99 (citing Code of Hammurabi §128);
CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 34; Reynolds, supra note 57, at 25.
60. Examples of marriage contracts of the period are as follows:
Judicial settlement: Ninmar, son of Lu-nannar, appeared and said, “In the
name of the king, Lu-Dingirra, son of Guzani, is to marry Damgula, my
daughter.” Arad, son of Ur-lamma, and Ur-shid, son of Lu-nannar, take an
oath to this. Lu-dingirra has been married to Damgula.
Nimar for a second time appeared and said: “Nin-azag-zu, daughter of Guzani,
is to marry my son, Sibkini.” It is attested that the name of the goddess
Ninmar and the name of the king were invoked in an oath. Sibkini, the
shepherd, has been married to Nin-azag-zu, Tile-e-makh-ta being the
Mashkim, Lu and Ur-ka-silim judges. In the year following the destruction of
Simanu. Hatton Lovejoy, The Code of Hammurabi, 1 GA. LAW. 32, 50 (19301931); see also DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 253-57 (presenting three
Babylonian marriage contracts); W.F. LEEMANS, LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
DOCUMENTS OF THE TIME OF HAMMURABI AND SAMSUILUNA (Mainly from
Lagaba) 76–77 (1960) (showing an example of Mesopotamian marriage
contract).
61. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. There is dispute as to
whether not Mesopotamians had marriage rituals beyond the contract and
oaths. Compare CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 27 (stating “most evidence
suggest that ancient Mesopotamians observed formalities, customs,
ceremonies, and various legal requirements as antecedents to a valid
marriage.”) with VERSTEEG, supra note 53, at 47 (arguing that only an oral
agreement was required).
61. VERSTEEG, supra note 53, at 18.
62. See Benton S. Oppenheimer, Some Ancient Laws, 9 U. CIN. L. REV. 101,
123 (1935) (arguing that numerous children were justification for allowing
concubines).
63. See POSTGATE, supra note 15, at 92 (citation omitted) (stating that “to
have a son and heir was of great importance: it gave you someone to support
you in your old age, and to appease your spirit after your death.”).
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would offend justice (or her destiny) if she failed to produce
offspring.64
Although Mesopotamian marriage is discussed in greater
detail later, it is important to understand at this juncture that,
prior to the creation of the Code of Hammurabi, marriage was
understood as a heterosexual, monogamous-ish, contractual
relationship that had a tendency to yield children.
C. Mesopotamian Jurisprudence and the Code of Hammurabi
1. Mesopotamian Jurisprudence
Mesopotamians understood “justice to have been a gift from
the gods.”65 As eluded to earlier, the gift of justice was comprised
of a balance of truth and destiny—a state in which each individual
fulfills “that which comes to him [or her] by nature or by his [or
her] place in society.”66 Mesopotamian kings were duty bound to
uphold justice.67
Mesopotamian kings fulfilled their duty by acting in
executive, legislative, and judicial capacities. A king’s executive
capacity was obviously evident in the fact that he headed the army
and protected his vassals from outside aggression. A king acted as
a legislature by issuing misharum.
Misharum is the Akkadian word that denotes “the quality of ‘equity’
in human society, that which is achieved by the king’s attempt to
bring human affairs into balance with kittum, ‘natural law.’” . . . At
the beginning of a [conquering] king’s reign, he pronounced his
misharum—an
edict—which
ordinarily
comprised
various
temporary economic reforms intended to alleviate financial
hardships created by the previous rulers.68

For example, Hammurabi’s misharum consisted of “canceling
outstanding debts” within the city-states he conquered so as to
solve the problem of debt servitude (and, no doubt, curry favor
with the freed).69 Finally, Mesopotamian kings acted as judges and
64. See BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 196 (explaining that “the destiny of a
woman, as a woman, was to bear and raise children according to the chosen
model of marriage and the patriarchal family.”); but see NEMET-NEJAT, supra
note 16, at 137 (noting that evidence suggests that couples used anal
intercourse as birth control).
65. VERSTEEG, supra note 53, at 18.
66. Id. at 17-18.
67. See MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 82 (noting that “[t]he king had to be the
‘good shepherd’ of his land, he had to care for his people as if they were a
defenseless flock.”).
68. VERSTEEG, supra note 53, at 19 (quoting NORMAN YOFEE, POLITICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 106 (1988)); see also BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 182
(explaining how Kittu (from which kittum is derived) and mêsaru are used
together to describe justice in Mesopotamia).
69. MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 11-12.
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dispensed justice by adjudicating civil cases.70 Mesopotamian
kings also had courts below them, presided over by assemblies and
appointed judges.71
Mesopotamians likely understood the idea of written law. As
stated earlier, Mesopotamians used writing to memorialize
contracts. Furthermore, there were codes of law that predated the
Code of Hammurabi, including the Lipit-Ishtar Code, the
Sumerian Code, and Laws of Eshnunna.72 Nonetheless, most law
in Mesopotamia was common law and unwritten.73
2. The Code of Hammurabi
The Code of Hammurabi was carved in the thirty-eighth year
of Hammurabi’s reign.74 The carved stele consisted of two parts:
(1) a bas-relief illustration; and (2) the inscription, which contains
the Code. The bas-relief illustrations depicted Hammurabi
(presumably symbolically) receiving “justice” from the sun god
Shamash.75 “The [stele’s]76 inscription has three parts to it: the
core is a long list of laws, which are framed by a prologue and an
epilogue containing a praise of King Hammurabi in the first
person.”77
The prologue began with a mythical account of powerful gods
founding the Kingdom of Babylon and anointing Hammurabi
70. See BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 165 (stating that “[w]e know that in
Mesopotamia the rendering of justice was a royal prerogative. . . . The ruler
often delegated the duty to his representatives, even to professional judges,
but it belonged to him in his own right. The procedural accounts, as well as
the royal correspondence, that have survived, show more than once how lower
authorities refer certain difficult or unusual cases to the royal tribunal.”); see
also POSTGATE, supra note 15, at 275 (explaining that the Mesopotamian
judiciary was charged with four tasks, not the least of which was settling
disputes between individuals).
71. See MIEROOP, supra note 18, at 127 (explaining that “[t]he assemblies,
both of the entire city and of the city quarters, acted as courts of law, next to
those staffed with judges appointed by the king.”).
72. CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 20.
73. “Unwritten does not mean nonexistent or unknown, but potential:
because it was constantly presented to the people in the form of positive or
prohibitive customs, transmitted together with education, or even in the form
of traditional solutions to particular problems.” BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 181.
74. MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 100; BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 165.
75. See MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 122 (stating that “[t]he relief on the top
was also understandable to non-literate people—that is most of the
population—and it showed how the sun god Shamash, the protector of justice,
gave a rod and a ring—probably emblems of justice—to Hammurabi.”); see also
EDWARDS, supra note 25, at 81-84 (describing bas-relief at the top of stele in
detail); Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 102 (describing Shamash bestowing
laws unto Hammurabi).
76. Urch, supra note 8, at 438.
77. MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 101; Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 102;
DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 36, 39.
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King.78 The prologue continued by describing Hammurabi’s
exploits as head of the state and a pious ruler.79 The prologue
concluded with a preface for the individual laws: “When [his god]
sent [Hammurabi] to rule over men, to give the protection of right
to the land, [he] did right . . . and brought about the well-being of
the oppressed.”80
The laws follow the prologue. The Code consisted of two
hundred eighty two laws or “articles”81 governing legal
proceedings; offenses against property; real estate; financial
arrangements; women, marriage, family property, and
inheritance; assault; professional fees and responsibilities;
agriculture; rates of hire; and slaves.82 The articles
“beg[a]n . . . with a ‘protasis,’ introduced by a conjunction ‘if,’ and
describing a concrete situation, a state of circumstantial elements,
in the past or in the present tense.”83 “The ‘apodosis’ which follows,
in the future tense, indicates what should be, on the judicial level
so to say, the result of such situation.”84 An example of this
structure is as follows:
If a man’s wife be surprised (in flagrante delicto) with another man,
both shall be tied and thrown into the water, but the husband may
pardon his wife and the king his slaves.85

The articles were secular in nature;86 the articles only
78. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, Prologue.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 19.
82. MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 103-04; Lovejoy, supra note 60, at 34-35.
The “articles” have been grouped according to different sectors of communal
life. Thus we find the following sequences: five paragraphs devoted to false
testimony (§§1-5); twenty devoted to theft (§§6-25); sixteen to tenure of royal
fiefs, a common practice in Mesopotamia, especially in this period (§§26-41);
approximately ten at least to places of dwelling (§§76- . . . the great lacuna due
to the erasing of the seven last columns on the obverse prevents us from
establishing exactly how many); at least twenty-four to commerce (§§. . . -111);
fifteen to deposits and debts (§§112-26); sixty-seven to wives and the family
(§§127-194); twenty to assault and battery (§§195-214); sixty-one to various
free professions followed by subordinate professions (§§215-277); and finally
five to slaves (§§278-82).
BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 159; DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 43-45.
83. BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 158.
84. Id.
85. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, §129; see also CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at
24 (finding that “penalties for crimes against the person varied according to
the class status both of the offender and of the injured party.”).
86. CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 20; BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 187-88;
Herbert J. Liebesny, Religious Law and Westernization in the Moslem Near
East, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 492, 492 (1953) (discussing secular nature of the Code
of Hammurabi); Donald G. McNeil, The Code of Hammurabi, 53 A.B.A. J. 444,
444 (1967) (discussing secular nature of the Code of Hammurabi); see also
Jenkins, supra note 7, at 335 (finding that “[i]t is purely a State document like
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anticipated civil cases;87 and many articles were based upon
established customs.88
The epilogue follows the articles. The epilogue celebrated
Hammurabi, much like the prologue,89 but the epilogue also
our own statute books . . . yet containing evident recognition of the church, in,
inter alia, its reference to ‘votaries,’ who were religiouses.” (quoting THE CODE
OF HAMMURABI, §182)); DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 39 (stating that
“[t]heir general character, too, is completely secular, and in this respect they
are strongly to be contrasted with the Hebrew laws; they are not a divine
pronouncement nor in any sense a religious document.”). Contra GORDON,
supra note 54, at 3 (finding that “it is significant that the authority of the law
depends on its divine origin. This claim of divine origin made any infraction of
the law an offense not only against the state or society but also against divine
order itself.”).
87. See Urch, supra note 8, at 438 (stating that “[t]he [C]ode of Hammurabi
is essentially a civil code. Compensation to the injured party paid by the
accused party in cases which are now regarded as criminal, reveals the failure
to look upon any act . . . as an offense against the State. The idea of an act
being an offense against the community rather than against an individual and
his family was of relatively late origin.”); see also McNeil, supra note 87, at 446
(finding that “[l]egal proceedings were commenced by the complaining party
and it’s probable that written pleadings were employed. Witnesses testified
under oath, and written as well as oral evidence was considered. Unlike
modern trials, however, the parties presented their own cases without
employing advocates. Decisions were embodied in written instruments
prepared by a scribe and witnessed and sealed. Many disputes were settled
rather than litigated and the settlements formalized in written, witnessed and
sworn contracts.”); Reynolds, supra note 57, at 24.
88. CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 20; Urch, supra note 8, at 437; see also id.
441 (stating that “Hammurabi’s code, in a sense the product of this [(i.e.,
Sumerian)] culture, was not extensively original, though it was far-sightedly
adapted to contemporary needs. How much of Sumerian customary law
actually passed into the later Semitic law cannot be determined. But the older
customs long attached to the land could not have been easily crowded out.”);
Fetzer, supra note 30, at 726 (discussing that “[m]any of the laws in the code
were taken directly from an older Sumerian code.”); Oppenheimer, supra note
62, at 106; ROAF, supra note 23, at 121 (stating that “[e]arlier codes of law
following a very similar pattern were promulgated by Shulgi of Ur, LipitIshtar of Isin, and Dadusha of Eshnunna.”); Reynolds, supra note 57, at 23;
BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 159 (discussing in detail the other codes known
within Mesopotamia); Lovejoy, supra note 60, at 34 (explaining that “[t]here
were several influences evident in these laws [of Hammurabi]. One, the
ancient law of wandering tribes; another that developed in settled
communities as life became more complex; the third, the lessening of severity
in punishment which time has always brought.”); DRIVER & MILES, supra note
47, at 6-8; VICTOR H. MATTHEWS & DON C. BENJAMIN, OLD TESTAMENT
PARALLELS: LAWS AND STORIES FROM THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 101, 103 (3d
ed. 2006) (citing the Code of Shulgi (c. 2094-2047 B.C.) and the Sumerian Code
(c. 1800 B.C.)); MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 109 (discussing that “[a]lready 300
years earlier, [before Hammurabi,] kings issued lists [of laws] of this type, and
these earlier examples elucidate partly how Hammurabi’s code was
composed.”).
89. See MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 109 (stating that “[t]he first sentence of
the epilogue, which states that the preceding cases were just verdicts by the
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includes two messages for different audiences.90 First, Hammurabi
spoke to “the oppressed, who ha[d] a lawsuit,”91 and described how
such individuals could take comfort in the fact that Hammurabi
brought justice to Mesopotamia. Second, Hammurabi counseled
future monarchs to emulate his wisdom and promised the gods’
graces if the monarch paid homage to Hammurabi.92 Nevertheless,
Hammurabi threatened any monarch who struck any of
Hammurabi’s laws, corrupted any of his words, or in any way
changed his monument.93 Hammurabi vowed that the gods would
destroy such as heedless monarch.94
Calling the Code of Hammurabi a “code of law” is an
imposition of modern concepts onto an ancient creation that does
not neatly fulfill the definition of either “code” or “law.”95 To call it
a “code” ignores the “disturbing lacunae in legislative matters”
within the Code,96 the lack of universal application to all
situations,97 and the inconsistencies in the resolution of cases.98 To
call the articles “laws” ignores the absence of evidence that the
Code was used. Despite the large volume of administrative and
legal literature to which historians have access,99 only one
correspondence records Hammurabi as having instructed liaisons
to enforce his Code.100 Moreover, “in the extensive documentation
king, advises the reader that these were at the basis of the laws.”); see also
W.W. DAVIES, THE CODES OF HAMMURABI AND MOSES WITH COPIOUS
COMMENTS, INDEX, AND BIBLE REFERENCES 107 (1905) (stating that “[t]he just
laws, which Hammurabi, the wise king, established.”); ROBERT FRANCIS
HARPER, THE CODE OF HAMMURABI KING OF BABYLON 99 (U. of Chi. Press
1904) (explaining that “[t]he righteous laws, which Hammurabi, the wise king,
established and (by which) he gave the land stable support and pure
government.”).
90. MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 110.
91. DAVIES, supra note 80, at 108.
92. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, Epilogue.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. SASSOON, SUPRA NOTE 4, at 168-74; BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 16263.
96. See BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 161 (noting that “we find no trace of the
organization of justice itself, nor the repression of delicts and of crimes. There
is no trace of criminal law properly speaking; there is no trace of a codification
of the social hierarchy, or political obligations, of administration, or of fiscal
policy.”).
97. See id. at 162 (arguing by example that §1 only addresses false
testimony regarding murder and not all testimonial matters).
98. Id. at 162-63.
99. Id. 163.
100. See MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 94 (explaining that Hammurabi wrote to
Sin-iddinam, “investigate the matter [of deserting soldiers], take care of their
case, and rend justice according to the laws that are now in force in
Yamutbal.”). See also ROAF, supra note 23, at 121. (stating that “[a]ll this is
very clear: in the eyes of its author the ‘Code’ was not at all intended to
exercise by itself a univocal normative value of legislative order. But it did
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of court cases judged in Hammurabi’s reign and afterwards, there
is no reference to a collection of laws that was the basis for a
decision.”101
Jean Bottéro argues that the Code “should not be considered
more than a type of anthology at best.”102 Bottéro contends that
“[w]hat Hammurabi wanted to collect in his ‘Code,’ . . . was a
selection of the principal decisions of law, the most just decisions,
the wisest, the most sagacious, the most worthy of an experienced
ruler.”103 Thus, the Code of Hammurabi could be more akin to a
Westlaw Reporter than a Code. In contrast, G.R. Miles and John
C. Driver argue that “[t]he Laws must not be regarded as a code or
digest, but as a series of amendments to the common law of
Babylon.”104 Thus, the Code of Hammurabi could be akin to an
executive order dictating the application of statutes. Viewed in
this way, the impetus for the Code’s creation may stem from the
Hammurabi’s “profound sense of justice,”105 which compelled
Hammurabi to make “uniform all the various and sometimes
conflicting laws and customs of the land.”106
In truth, the Code of Hammurabi does not—and did not—
need to be a singular solution to a singular problem. The Code of
Hammurabi could have been a guide for dispensing justice or a
memorial of excellent decisions at the same time that it was a
rhetorical monument to convey the political legitimacy of
Hammurabi’s rule via ethos (i.e., the first-person nature of the
Code as well as the description of Hammurabi’s deeds), pathos
have value as a model; it was instructive and educative in the judicial order.”).
BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 167.
101. MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 107; see also ROAF, supra note 23, at 121
(finding that “there is little evidence to suggest that the Law Code was used to
redress injustice, except for the occasional mention in legal documents of a
stele that might have been Hammurabi’s.”); see also BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at
163 (stating that “no verdict was given, no official decision was taken, nor any
agreement signed that made a reference to any article of the so-called ‘Code.’”).
Contra Fetzer, supra note 30, at 729 (alleging that “[t]he judges were strictly
supervised. Appeal to the king was allowed, but if the code gave the rule in the
case, the action was remanded with instructions to enter judgment according
to the code.”)
102. BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 161.
103. Id. 165 (citing the Code of Hammurabi’s epilogue).
104. DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 41; see also POSTGATE, supra note
15, at 289 (making a similar case and arguing that the “[articles] may be
considered laws, in that they are fixing principles or practices to be applied in
the administration of law.”). “[T]hey are not collections of individual cases,
‘case law’ [‘In the case of A vs B at Larsa on day x the king judged as follows’].”
Id.
105. See DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 52 (explaining that
“Hammurabi’s letters show his deep interest in law and justice, and it may be
assumed that his part in the preparation of the Laws [or Code] was no less
than that of Napoleon in the drafting of the Civil Code.”).
106. Fetzer, supra note 30, at 726.
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(i.e., the appeal to the divine and the offer of a solution to the
aggrieved), and logos (i.e., the just reasoning inherent in the
articles). Regardless of its purpose at the time, it has always been
viewed as a source of wisdom. “Students . . . copied out parts of the
text on clay tablets”107 long after Hammurabi’s reign and
“[s]cholars of the first millennium wrote interpretations of the
laws.”108 This Article continues in that tradition.
III. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI’S GOVERNANCE OF
MARRIAGE
Early civilization was fragile.109 Hammurabi likely recognized
his world’s frailty more than anyone else. It is evident that
Hammurabi actively sought to ward off the destruction of his
empire from both internal and external sources. Within his
conquered city-states, Hammurabi was adept at “making riches
and increase”110 through the building of walls,111 temples, and
canals.112 But, as all ruins attest, a stable society is not built on
infrastructure alone. Thus, Hammurabi also used his Code as a
tool for mollifying his empire.
As stated earlier, Hammurabi did not invent marriage, but
through his Code he worked to ensure the institution strengthened
his society.113 Hammurabi drafted a web of marital mandates that
shaped the institution of marriage into a solution for the problemquestions:
1. How does society promote procreation?
2. How does society nurture children into successful
adulthood?
3. How does society minimize particular causes of
poverty?
The laws in reference to marriage114 solve (or address) the
problem-questions in four ways. First, the Code defines marriage.
Second, the Code protects marital fidelity. Third, the Code
107. MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 129.
108. Id. at 130.
109. See e.g., SASSOON, SUPRA NOTE 4, at 107 (discussing the frailty of
ancient society).
110. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, Prologue.
111. MIEROOP, supra note 8, at 82-83.
112. Id.
113. See Lovejoy, supra note 60, at 35 (stating that “[t]he laws in reference
to marriage and related subjects constitute about one-fifth of the [C]ode and
are comprehensive.”).
114. This Article is concerned with marriage—a subset of family law.
Attempting to distinguish the marital provisions of family law from the other
provisions of family as well as criminal law and estates can be difficult at best
and foolhardy at worst. This Article will attempt to segregate these topics by
including statutes that discuss spouses from other provisions. This is a general
proposition and exceptions will be made.
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allocates responsibilities among spouses. Fourth, the Code uses
the marital relationship to preserve economic resources within
families.
A. Defining Marriage as a Contract Between Gentlemen
The Code echoed custom and dictated that daughters became
wives via contract. Although “no [connection] . . . between the law
of sale and the law of marriage has been shown,”115 the Code of
Hammurabi applied a transactional vocabulary and process to
marriage formation.
The parties to the contract were typically the groom and the
bride’s father.116 Nevertheless, a groom’s father or older brother
might act for him and the Code mandates that the bride’s brothers
act for her in the event of her father’s absence. The male acting for
the bride chose the groom,117 and could even marry the bride off to
a slave.118
Consistent with contractual principles, the marriage contract
required consideration. The bride entered the marriage with a
dowry that was typically greater than the “bride-price.”119 In
115. DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 261, 263-65.
116. Id. at 249.
117. See CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 34 (explaining that “[a] man might
negotiate for himself, but apparently a girl’s first husband was selected by
some member of her family. Once married, however, she was no longer under
parental control.”); see also THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §184 (stating that “[i]f a
man do[es] not give a dowry to his daughter by a concubine, and no husband
[is present]; if then her father die, her brother shall give her a dowry according
to her father’s wealth and secure a husband for her.”); POSTGATE, supra note
15, at 97 (citation omitted); THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §183 (discussing that
“[h]owever, [i]f a man give his daughter by a concubine a dowry, and a
husband, and a deed; if then her father die, she shall receive no portion from
the paternal estate.”).
118. D. Oswald Dykes, The Code of Hammurabi, 16 JURID. REV. 72, 79
(1904); see also THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §175 (stating that “[i]f a State slave
or the slave of a freed man marry the daughter of a free man, and children are
born, the master of the slave shall have no right to enslave the children of the
free.”).
119. See EDWARDS, supra note 25, at 100 (stating that the bride’s father
gave her a “dowry” . . . which usually, but not necessarily, included the “brideprice.”); Dykes, supra note 118, at 76 (explaining that “[a] bride-price is still
paid to the father of the bride, but by the time of the Code it was usual for him
to settle upon his daughter a dowry which often exceeded the amount of the
bride-price, and thus made the purchase of the bride a mere form and
survival.”); contra NEMET-NEJAT, supra note 16, at 133 (explaining that “[t]he
bride-price was equal in value to the dowry provided by the bride’s family. The
dowry consisted of household utensils, silver rings (a form of ancient coinage),
slaves, and even fields. In addition to these items, the dowry in later periods
included other household goods such as furniture, textiles, and jewelry. The
bride brought her dowry with her. A husband could use his wife’s property and
manage it with his own assets.”); id. at 135 (stating that “[a] bed, included in
dowry lists, was used to consummate the marriage.”). In addition to the bride
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return, “[t]he suitor or his family pa[id] a certain sum as ‘brideprice.’”120 Although the bride-price was consideration, it was not a
purchase price.121 Wives were not for sale. Rather, the Code
mandated an exchange of consideration because the consideration
served as insurance.122 For example, the bride-price protected the
father of a would-be bride from a philandering suitor. The Code
states:
If any one, who has brought chattels into his father-in-law’s house,
and has paid the purchase-money, looks for another wife, and says
to his father-in-law: “I do not want your daughter,” the girl’s father
may keep all that he had brought.123

The Code, likewise, protected the suitor from a fickle fatherin-law and scheming, competing suitors:
If a man bring[s] chattels into the house of his father-in-law, and
pay the “purchase price” (for his wife): if then the father of the girl
say: “I will not give you my daughter,” he shall give him back all
that he brought with him.124
If a man bring chattels into his father-in-law’s house and pay the
“purchase price,” if then his friend slander him, and his father-inlaw say to the young husband: “You shall not marry my daughter,”
then he shall give back to him undiminished all that he had brought
with him; but his wife shall not be married to the friend.125

Assuming nobody changed his mind, nobody was slandered,
and the consideration was exchanged, the Code mandated that the
price, tradition suggests there may have been a mandatory meal. POSTGATE,
supra note 15, at 284; DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 249; see also S.
Greengus, Old Babylonian Marriage Ceremonies and Rites, 20 JOURNAL OF
CUNEIFORM STUDIES 55-72 (1966) (describing a list of expenses for the father
of the bride). Dowries were also given to daughters and sisters who were not
brides. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §§178-82.
120. EDWARDS, supra note 25, at 100.
121. See CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 34 (finding that the bride price “was
apparently merely a part of the marriage ritual and did not imply wife
purchase, since the bride seems generally to have claimed for herself the token
payment.”); see also DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 259-65 (explaining
that “the Babylonian scribes and lawyers certainly did not regard marriage as
a form of marriage by purchase.”).
122. See Fetzer, supra note 30, at 728 (explaining that “[t]he contract
usually stated the consequences to which each party was liable for repudiating
the other.”); see also SASSOON, SUPRA NOTE 4, at 68 (noting that “[t]he bride
price was paid by the man, so when he was at fault he lost what he had paid, a
single cost and a single penalty; but the girl had received a bride price, so if
she was at fault to pay it back would leave her where she started, in fact,
paying nothing and with no penalty; while to pay it back double would
actually have cost her one bride price only, the same cost or penalty for
changing her mind as was incurred by the man for the same offence.”).
123. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §159.
124. Id. at §160.
125. Id. at §161.
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marriage be sealed through sexual intercourse.126 The Code
specifically dictated that “[i]f a man take a woman to wife, but
have no intercourse with her, this woman is no wife to him.”127
After intercourse, a marriage was recognized and the bride joined
the groom’s family.128 Nevertheless, sometimes consummation (or
finalization) of the marriage would occur years after the marriage
contract was created because a spouse—typically the bride—was
too young.129
Once a marital contract was completed and the marital bed
christened, it is likely that most Mesopotamian couples lived their
lives without the intrusion from the Code’s marital mandates.
Presumptively, amicable Mesopotamian marriages solved all of
the problems within their sphere of influence.130 The next time the
Code’s marriage edicts were applicable to their lives was during
the division of property upon the death of a spouse. Nevertheless,
some marriages of the time—as now—were burdened with discord
and crossed paths with the Code.
B. Protecting Marriage’s Procreative Purpose
The procreative purpose of Mesopotamian marriage was
evident at a marriage’s formation and endured until the marriage
ended.131 The Code promoted this primary purpose by preserving
husbands’ exclusive sexual access to their wives and protecting the
marital relationship and procreation even against the threat of
126. See DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 249 (stating that the contract
proves “that a lawful marriage has taken place, while the bringing and
accepting of the various gifts by the parties concerned effect an inchoate
marriage which the copula carnalis completes.”).
127. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §128; see also DRIVER & MILES, supra note
47, at 245-47, 263 (disagreeing in the interpretation of §128 to actually mean
an executed contract is required, not intercourse; later affirming that
intercourse is necessary); VERSTEEG, supra note 53, at 47 (quoting DRIVERS &
MILES, supra note 47).
128. POSTGATE, supra note 15, at 103; NEMET-NEJAT, supra note 16, at 135;
DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 249-51; see also BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at
186 (finding that “[i]n this very patriarchal society it was the woman who
abandoned her own family in order to live and to die in the family of her
husband.”).
129. POSTGATE, supra note 15, at 103; DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at
249-51, 262-63; see also NEMET-NEJAT, supra note 16, at 135 (noting that
although a groom could have theoretically married an older woman, this was
uncommon and “[t]he groom was usually ten years older than his bride.”).
130. “So long as a marriage proceeds harmoniously laws do not matter: laws
for the conduct of a happy marriage did not exist in the ancient world any
more than they do now.” SASSOON, SUPRA NOTE 4, at 71.
131. See Lovejoy, supra note 60, at 35 (stating that “[c]hildren were a prime
factor in all marriages.”); see also NEMET-NEJAT, supra note 16, at 152
(explaining that “[i]n ancient Mesopotamia the most important role of a
woman in marriage was to bear children, particularly sons, who were
preferred as heirs.”).
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sterility.132
Society’s survival requires reproduction. Mesopotamian
society chose marriage—with its cooperating biological parents—
as the best organization for nurturing the community’s future
members. But, cooperating biological parents are often more of an
ideal than a reality. Notwithstanding the fact that Mesopotamian
mothers and fathers, no doubt universally, desired the survival of
their progeny, Mesopotamian mothers and fathers engaged in
fundamentally
different
parental-investment
calculi.
A
Mesopotamian mother could always recognize her child because
hers was the infant that moments before was inside of her. Thus,
she risked almost nothing by nursing and nurturing that infant
into adulthood. Not only could a Mesopotamian father not nurse,
but the possibility that he might waste his resources ensuring the
survival of another man’s child was a constant threat.133
In the wild, a new alpha male lion—fresh from his victory
against the outgoing alpha (now beta) male—resolves paternal
uncertainty by killing all of the cubs within a pride and then
defending his exclusive sexual access to the lionesses.134
Hammurabi resolved the paternal-uncertainty dilemma for the
Mesopotamian male by dictating that husbands had exclusive
sexual access to their wives.135 From the husband’s perspective,
the Code protected a right.136 From the wife’s prospective, the
132. See CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 22 (finding that “[t]he laws of a people
are not merely a statement of rights but also a declaration of principles. They
define both what may be expected and what is just.”).
133. Studies relating to evolutionary psychology affirm that this is a concern
for males even today. See Robert Ervin Cramer, William Todd Abraham,
Lesley M. Johnson, & Barbara Manning-Ryan, Gender Differences in
Subjective Distress to Emotional and Sexual Infidelity: Evolutionary and
Logical Explanation, in Love, Romance, and Sexual Interaction: Research
Perspectives in CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY 198 (Nathaniel J. Pallone ed.,
Transaction Publishers 2003) (explaining that “[s]exual infidelity, on the other
hand, is predicted to be more distressing for men than for women because men
have evolved a mate selection strategy that places a premium on sexual
exclusivity and the resultant increase in paternity certainty.”); CRAIG
STANFORD, SIGNIFICANT OTHERS: THE APE-HUMAN CONTINUUM AND THE
QUEST FOR HUMAN NATURE 25 (Basic Books 2001). Conversely, in exchange
for their sexual fidelity, Hammurabi ensures that husbands provide the
resources necessary to raise their children.
134. Glen Hausfater, Infanticide: Comparative and Evolutionary
Perspectives, 25 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 500 (Aug.–Oct. 1984).
135. See Duran Bell, Defining Marriage and Legitimacy, 38 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 237, 237 (April 1997) (ensuring paternity or the reproduction
of “legitimate” children has been the foundation to most traditional academic
definitions of marriage).
136. See DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 288-89 (finding that “adultery
in Babylonia and Assyria, as also amongst the Hebrews, was not the same
offence as adultery in English law, since it could only be committed with a
married woman. It was an offence against a husband but not against a wife. A
wife could take no proceedings against her husband for adultery committed

Do Not Delete

2013]

1/21/2014 4:59 PM

When the Mesopotamian Honeymoon Ends

1075

Code dictated a responsibility.137
This responsibility (or obligation to fidelity) preceded
marriage. A new bride—which excludes a remarrying widow or
divorcee—was expected to be a virgin.138 “[I]n a case where a
bride’s virginity was disputed the courts were prepared if
necessary to call on the expertise of female witnesses to give
testimony on such matter.”139
Once married, the penalties for the wife who strayed from her
responsibilities could be severe.140 For example, adulterers, who
were caught in the act, were pitched into the river.141
Nevertheless, Hammurabi was a merciful judge. Hammurabi
believed that the threat of death served as a strong deterrent,142
but he also recognized that evidence of extramarital affairs was
suspect. When a wife was caught “in flagrante delicto,” there was
certainty that she strayed from her responsibility. Therefore, she
deserved the ultimate punishment. But when the husband did not
witness the affair,143 Hammurabi did not sentence the wife to
death.144
For example, the Code stated: “If a man bring a charge
against one’s wife, but she is not surprised with another man, she
must take an oath and then may return to her house.”145 This
edict—like all edicts within the Code—must be considered from
the perspective of Hammurabi hearing the case. Hammurabi was
whether with a married or with an unmarried woman. It may be then that a
man who cohabits with a woman not living with her husband is not regarded
as an adulterer; he does not break up the home.”).
137. Id.
138. See EDWARDS, supra note 25, at 99 (finding that “[m]any contract
tablets deal with . . . [marriage], and the virginity of the bride is frequently
guaranteed.”).
139. See POSTGATE, supra note 15, at 104 (citation omitted) (explaining that
“[t]his can also be attributed to the paramount desire of the family to ensure
that it is its own male line which will be perpetuated, and is of course matched
by the expectation that the wife, or the living-in bride, will behave respectably
and remain within the family vision.”); see also NEMET-NEJAT, supra note 16,
at 135 (explaining that “[a]fter the wedding night, they [(i.e., friends of the
bride)] displayed ‘the bloody sheet.’”).
140. See POSTGATE, supra note 15, at 278 (explaining that in addition to
punishment for sexual infidelity, a wife was punished if she and her paramour
had her husband killed, THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §153, or if she was not
culpable in the murder but failed to report it).
141. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §129; MATTHEWS & BENJAMIN, supra note
88, at 109 (edict can also be found in Deuteronomy 22:22).
142. But see SASSOON, supra note 4, at 29 (arguing that ancient laws
should not be criticized for their harsh penalties).
143. DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 281.
144. See generally CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 24 (describing all of the laws
within the Code of Hammurabi that require the death penalty).
145. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §131; MATTHEWS & BENJAMIN, supra note
88, at 110 (edict can also be found in Numbers 5:12-22).
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concerned with policy and evidence. He needed to protect a
husband’s exclusive sexual access to his wife. However, he could
not provide a husband—who was perhaps interested in ending his
marriage and keeping his wife’s dowry—with an exit based on an
unfounded accusation. Otherwise, divorces would cease and
drowned wives would make the Tigris and the Euphrates
impassible. Therefore, by allowing a wife to return home after
taking an oath, Hammurabi effectively announced that a
husband’s accusation without proof was not actionable.
In addition to accusations of adultery by husbands,
Hammurabi also had to adjudicate accusations from third parties.
The Code states:
If any one “point the finger (slander) at . . . the wife of any one, and
can not prove it, this man shall be taken before the judges and his
brow shall be marked.146
If the “finger is pointed” at a man’s wife about another man, but she
is not caught sleeping with the other man, she shall jump into the
river for her husband.147

These edicts are not meant to communicate that for every
third-party accusation, a woman jumps into the river and the
accuser gets his face cut up. Rather, these situations probably
speak to a burden of proof.148 As stated above, Hammurabi was
concerned with policy and evidence. In the first scenario, there was
likely an accusation that did not rise to reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. In the second scenario, there was likely probable
cause. The distinction is important because under the second
scenario if Hammurabi found the wife blameless and ordered her
to take an oath and return to her home (as before), her husband
may become a lion: he may kill his children because of their
questionable paternity. Nevertheless, Hammurabi may be unjustly
putting a woman to death, if he found the wife at fault. As both of
these options were imprudent given the state of the evidence,
Hammurabi relied on the omniscience of the gods and the
superstition of his time to settle a difficult case. Given his options,
the river ordeal was likely the most just response.
In Mesopotamia, adultery was a matter of consent.149 Where a
bride or wife did not consent to intercourse and was raped, she
was blameless and her attacker was put to death.150 Moreover, it
146. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §127.
147. Id. §132.
148. For one thing, the sections were not placed beside one another in the
actual Code, which would suggest relationship. Compare id. §§127, 132, with
id. §§142-43.
149. See SASSOON, supra note 4, at 116 (stating that “[i]n every case the
woman must have consented to intercourse, because if she had not consented
it would not have been adultery but rape.”).
150. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §130 (stating, “[i]f a man violate the wife
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was presumed that a bride or wife could never consent to incest.151
In the case of the bride, if the incest involved her soon-to-be fatherin-law, she was released from the marriage contract and allowed
to marry the man “of her heart.”152
If infidelity did not threaten marriage, sterility might. The
Code of Hammurabi anticipated this problem and offered three
solutions: divorce, a surrogate mother, or adoption.153 Although the
Code has numerous provisions concerning adoption, this Article
does not concern those provisions.154
Divorce was allowed in Mesopotamian society, but
Hammurabi was likely concerned about the public policy
(betrothed or child-wife) of another man, who has never known a man, and
still lives in her father’s house, and sleep with her and be surprised, this man
shall be put to death, but the wife is blameless.”); MATTHEWS & BENJAMIN,
supra note 88, at 109 (edict can also be found in Deuteronomy 22:23-27); see
also id. at 102 (citing similar edict within Code of Shugli). In contrast,
“[u]nder Athenian law, a man’s seduction of another’s wife was punishable by
death, but rape . . . merited only a monetary fine . . . [because] the rapist did
not pose a threat to the husband’s household property because the woman
could be counted on to dislike the rapist.” COONTZ, supra note 4, at 66.
Moreover, the rape of an unmarried and un-engaged woman carried almost no
penalty within the Sumerian Code. MATTHEWS & BENJAMIN, supra note 88, at
104 (edict can also be found in Genesis 34, Exodus 22:16, and Deuteronomy
22:23-24).
151. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §154 (stating “[i]f a man be guilty of
incest with his daughter, he shall be driven from the place (exiled).”);
MATTHEWS & BENJAMIN, supra note 88, at 111 (edict can also be found in
Leviticus 18:6-18; 20:10-21 and Deuteronomy 27:20, 22-23)); see also THE
CODE OF HAMMURABI §155 (stating “[i]f a man betroth a girl to his son, and
his son have intercourse with her, but he (the father) afterward defile her, and
be surprised, then he shall be bound and cast into the water (drowned).”); THE
CODE OF HAMMURABI §156 (explaining that “[i]f a man betroth a girl to his
son, but his son has not known her, and if then he defile her, he shall pay her
half a gold mina, and compensate her for all that she brought out of her
father’s house. She may marry the man of her heart.”); POSTGATE, supra note
15, at 104 (stating that “if a father-in-law ‘knew’ a bride brought to his house
for one of his sons, the law requires a fine of half a mina of silver and the girl
is released. If, on the other hand, his son had already co-habitated with her,
incest had been committed and the father is sentenced to drowning.”); THE
CODE OF HAMMURABI §157 (discussing that “[i]f any one be guilty of incest
with his mother after his father, both shall be burned.”); MATTHEWS &
BENJAMIN, supra note 88, at 111 (edict can also be found in Leviticus 18:8,
20:11 and Deuteronomy 27:20); THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §158 (explaining
that “[i]f any one be surprised after his father with his chief wife, who has
borne children, he shall be driven out of his father’s house.”); MATTHEWS &
BENJAMIN, supra note 88, at 111 (edict can also be found in Leviticus 19:2022).
152. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §156.
153. POSTGATE, supra note 15, at 92 (citation omitted).
154. See THE CODE OF Hammurabi §§185-93 (regarding more information
on Mesopotamian adoption law); see also POSTGATE, supra note 15, at 93
(citing Mesopotamian adoption contract); NEMET-NEJAT, supra note 16, at
131-32.
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associated with repudiating a wife for her perceived sterility. The
best case scenario for such a divorcee would be a return to her
father or brother’s care and a life of spinsterhood. The worst-case
scenario was prostitution or poverty. Thus, the Code anticipated
that before divorce, a marriage’s procreative purpose would be
fulfilled with a surrogate: a second wife, concubine, or slave.155 If
a wife provided a husband with a surrogate who provided him
with children, then the sterile wife would not be cast off.156 If this
was not incentive enough to provide her husband with a surrogate,
the Code also held that the surrogate would not be of equal status
with the wife.157 Despite her secondary status, the surrogate was
also protected. For example, a husband could not sell a slavesurrogate who yields children.158
The Code of Hammurabi did not restrict a man’s sexual
freedom,159 except by forbidding rape, incest, and affairs with

155. See BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 186 (stating “[t]he procreating purpose
of this union was so essential that the sterility of the woman constituted
sufficient reason for the husband to repudiate her, at least if she did not
provide him with a replacement who would put into the world children that
she would consider her own, without changing her position towards her
husband in the least.”); see also COONTZ, supra note 4, at 20 (arguing that the
practice of a woman bringing “extra-wives” into the marital relationship has
occurred frequently throughout history).
156. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §144 (stating “[i]f a man take a wife and
this woman give her husband a maid-servant, and she bear him children, but
this man wishes to take another wife, this shall not be permitted to him; he
shall not take a second wife.”).
157. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §145 (stating “[i]f a man take a wife, and
she bear him no children, and he intend to take another wife: if he take this
second wife, and bring her into the house, this second wife shall not be allowed
equality with his wife.”); see, e.g., COONTZ, supra note 4, at 56 (citing BARBARA
WATTERSON, WOMEN IN EGYPT [page no] (Alan Sutton Publishing 1991))
(finding that “[o]ne Babylonian marriage contract specified that the second
wife had to prepare the first wife’s daily meal and carry her chair to the
temple.”).
158. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §146 (stating “[i]f a man take a wife and
she give this man a maid-servant as wife and she bear him children, and then
this maid assume equality with the wife: because she has borne him children
her master shall not sell her for money, but he may keep her as a slave,
reckoning her among the maid-servants.”); see also THE CODE OF HAMMURABI
§147 (explaining “[i[f [a maid-servant] have not borne him children, then her
mistress may sell her for money.”).
159. See Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 122 (stating “[w]e should not, at
such an early stage in civilization, expect to find a high degree of refinement
in sexual matters. Indeed, there seems to be a pretty well-defined opinion that
the primitive Semites were especially given over to unregulated
indulgence . . . Therefore we are not surprised to find that the Hammurabic
Code contains relatively few provisions regulative of sexual relations.”). Cf.
NEMET-NEJAT, supra note 16, at 137 (finding that “[e]rotic art was found in
temples, tombs, and houses and may have reflected a genre somewhere
between official and popular art.”).
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married women.160 Even if his wife was prodigious in her
reproductive capacities, a husband was free to take a concubine.161
Moreover, prostitution was unregulated.162 Thus, by requiring a
husband to take a surrogate second wife, concubine, or slave,
Hammurabi protected the rights of a wife163 while honoring the
cultural norms of the time.
Having discussed bride prices, the death penalty for adultery,
and the robust use of concubines and prostitutes, the Code of
Hammurabi appears biased. Since the Fifth Century B.C., the
Code’s treatment of women has been viewed as misogynistic (and
likely seemed unfair to at least one Mesopotamian woman).164
Modern scholars argue, “the Code of Hammurabi . . . [was] used to
160. See BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 187 (stating “[t]he law . . . sought only to
preserve the essential conditions of the institution of matrimony. . . . [I]t left
the man almost entirely free to exercise his amorous capabilities elsewhere if
he felt like it, stipulating only that he support his legal family and that he not
violate anybody’s rights.”).
161. See EDWARDS, supra note 25, at 100. (finding that “[l]ike the chief wife,
[the concubine] also carried bride-price and dowry, and we may assume that
she possessed the same rights as the chief wife in regard to maintenance and
participation in the husband’s estate.”). Just as with surrogates, the Code
anticipated that man would support his offspring by a concubine or prostitute.
See also THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §183 (stating that “i]f a man give his
daughter by a concubine a dowry, and a husband, and a deed; if then her
father die, she shall receive no portion from the paternal estate.”); id. §184 (“If
a man do not give a dowry to his daughter by a concubine, and no husband; if
then her father die, her brother shall give her a dowry according to her
father’s wealth and secure a husband for her.”).
162. See Reynolds, supra note 57, at 28 (explaining that “neither
prostitution itself nor commercialized vice in any form was penalized in the
Code of Hammurabi. The prostitute was literally an abandoned woman,
ignored by law.”). Although their profession was unregulated, prostitutes were
not respected. “Prostitutes were [viewed] at a lesser level because the
paternity of their children could not be assured and thus they had
“missed . . . [their] destiny.” BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 196. The Code of
Hammurabi suggests that prostitute’s children were commonly given up for
adoption. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §192 (stating “[i]f a son of a paramour or
a prostitute say to his adoptive father or mother: ‘You are not my father, or my
mother,’ his tongue shall be cut off.”); THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §193
(explaining that “[i]f the son of a paramour or a prostitute desire his father’s
house, and desert his adoptive father and adoptive mother, and goes to his
father’s house, then shall his eye be put out.”).
163. Cf. DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 245-49 (describing that
ownership of the marital contract belongs to the wife).
164. For example, the historian Herodotus described the marriage as slavemarket type sale. See HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES, 120 (Betty Radice, ed.,
Aubrey de Sélincourt, trans. 1972). In every village once a year all the girls of
marriageable age used to be collected together in one place, while the men
stood round them in a circle; an auctioneer then called each one in turn to
stand up and offered her for sale, beginning with the best-looking and going on
to the second best as soon as the first had been sold for a good price.
Herodotus’ assertions are unsupported by other records from the period.
REYNOLDS, supra note 57, at 30.
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legitimize the . . . cultural ideology of female subordination and
male dominance.”165
Although Hammurabi was certainly no feminist and one
should be critical of the Code’s treatment of women, there are
mitigating considerations. First, Hammurabi did not invent
marriage or its norms. Throughout time, there have always been
gender norms and cultural expectations about how spouses would
treat one another. Specifically, Mesopotamian women and men
presumably wanted to couple and have children. Second, the Code
was not wantonly cruel. Hammurabi’s edicts always reflected a
balance of interests. For example, whenever Hammurabi imposed
a responsibility, he usually awarded a corresponding right. Third,
a Mesopotamian woman had more freedoms than many of her
historical counterparts. She “could operate an independent
business, own slaves, control an estate, buy and sell property in
her name, make a will, carry her grievances to court, retain
possession of her legacy, [and] adopt a son or a daughter.”166 Thus,
being married in Mesopotamia did not equate to slavery. Finally,
as John Sassoon argues, “[n]either the city nor family could
survive if the wife tried to exercise the same priorities as her
husband or the husband the same priorities as his wife.”167 Thus,
freedoms restricted by the Code were likely codified responses to
perceived threats.168
C. Allocating Responsibilities Amongst Spouses
Although society’s survival requires reproduction, procreation
alone is useless if children are not fed, nurtured, protected, taught
a trade, prepared for membership within the community,169 and
165. Ricki Lewis Tannen, Setting the Agenda for the 1990s: The Historical
Foundations of Gender Bias in the Law: A Context for Reconstruction, 42 FLA.
L. REV. 163, 166 (1990); see also Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 118
(explaining “[t]he primary purpose of matrimony was perpetuation of the
husband’s name and estate; and in the establishment of the family the woman
was not a free agent. Her husband was chosen for her, and she was handed
over to him in exchange for a monetary or property payment.”).
166. CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 35.
167. SASSOON, supra note 4, at 79; CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 35; see
also Fetzer, supra note 30, at 726 (stating that “the position of women in this
early Babylonian world, as in Egypt, was high, free and dignified.”);
Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 118.
168. Admittedly, these mitigating circumstances would be a cold comfort to
a Mesopotamian wife who found herself in a polygamous marriage because she
could not have children or who found herself swimming for her life based upon
an unjust accusation of infidelity. However, the reader can take comfort in
knowing that the edicts concerning procreation, allocating resources among
spouses, and divorce—in other words, the majority of the edicts discussed in
this Article—only applied to an unfortunate subset of all marriages during
Hammurabi’s reign.
169. See BOTTÉRO, supra note 8, at 186 (finding that “[m]arriage was first of
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given resources – such as dowry or land – that are necessary for
their adult life.170 Thus, in addition to defining marriage and
protecting the procreative relationship, Hammurabi’s Code
allocated rights and responsibilities among spouses in order to
provide for the needs of each spouse and, in turn, the needs of
children.
For Mesopotamian spouses, the Code of Hammurabi reflects
corresponding rights and responsibilities. Rights were claims to
resources.171 Responsibilities were duties that corresponded with
rights. These corresponding rights and responsibilities reflected
the reality that a human being in Mesopotamia could not survive
alone,172 because spouses needed each other.173
In exchange for mandating their fidelity, the Code gave wives
the right to their husband’s resources.174 For example, the Code

all a type of contract of association with the aim to procreate and to educate
the descendants of the family.”).
170. See POSTGATE, supra note 15, at 92 (noting that “[s]ons and daughters
lived in the father’s house until they left for another household, either
founding their own or marrying into another.”).
171. See BELL, supra note 134, at 238 (finding that “[r]egardless of the form
of society, the existence of a right implies a socially supported claim on scarce
resources for some category of person—such as the claim of child for essential
consumption goods from its parents or the claims of a young man for
bridewealth cattle.” ).
172. See SASSOON, supra note 4, at 106 (noting that “[t]he [family]
relationship is not hierarchical or patronizing; it is reciprocal ownership, and
it is the product of the normal working of nature. The concept of family gives
to each the identity of the whole, it enlarges life and is creative in two senses;
it replaces loneliness with self-confidence and is the foundation of the
future.”).
173. COONTZ, supra note 4, at 30, 67; see id. at 38 (discussing the
organization of early human groups and the necessity of divisions of labor); see
also SASSOON, supra note 4, at 176 (stating that “[i]n evolutionary terms the
family or clan, which were essential for physical survival, may have been the
primary unit by which early man identified himself.”).
174. See Reynolds, supra note 57, at 26 (arguing that “it appears that the
contract of marriage imposed upon the husband the obligation to provide for
his wife in order to retain his right to her fidelity.”); see also CHAMBLIS, supra
note 13, at 35 (1954) (stating that Hammurabi provided a man with “a
helpmate and not a household drudge; although [a husband] was the nominal
head of the family [the wife] was protected against abuse and given rights.”).
Just as biology served as the basis for the principles preserving paternal
certainty so too does biological evidence buttress the edicts dictating that
husbands provide for wives. Biological evidence suggests that where males are
concerned with fidelity and paternal certainty, females are most concerned
with ensuring that they have a mate who will provide resources to support
their offspring. Cramer, et al., supra note 133, at 197 (citations omitted). In
studies designed to measure desirable qualities in mates, females consistently
prescribe “more points to the item describing a mate with high resource
potential—motivated and intelligent, loyal and honest, and good earning
capacity and college educated.” Id. at 68.
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barred a husband from casting out a sick wife,175 but permitted a
sick wife to leave her husband’s house and take her dowry with
her.176 Moreover, the Code expected that a husband would provide
for his wife in his absence. In fact, if he did not provide for her
when he was away, she was “held blameless” for seeking support
from the man next door.177 Nevertheless, if a husband provided for
his wife in his absence and she moved in with his neighbor, then
she was put to death.178 This edict reflects the policy that a
husband’s right to sexual access is protected so long as he does not
shirk his corresponding responsibilities. Additionally, it also gave
solace to the army of men that marched around with Hammurabi
and helped him build his empire.179 Therefore, the Code also
dictated that:
[i]f a man be taken prisoner in war and there be no sustenance in
his house and his wife go to another house and bear children; and if
later her husband return and come to his home: then this wife shall
return to her husband, but the children follow their father.180

As this provision illustrates, the Code “shows the practical
economic approach to a realistic situation[;] . . . the [Code] is
devoid of sentimentality or moralizing, in the face of stern

175. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §148 (stating “[i]f a man take a wife, and
she be seized by disease, if he then desire to take a second wife he shall not
put away his wife, who has been attacked by disease, but he shall keep her in
the house which he has built and support her so long as she lives.”); see also
DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 310-11 (arguing this disease is probably
malaria fever or ague because lepers were excluded from the city, lunatics
would not have been able to control their dowry, and a sterile wife could be
outright divorced).
176. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §149 (stating “[i]f this woman does not
wish to remain in her husband’s house, then he shall compensate her for the
dowry that she brought with her from her father’s house, and she may go.”).
177. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §134 (stating “[i]f any one be captured in
war and there is not sustenance in his house, if then his wife go to another
house this woman shall be held blameless.”); see also Shamma Friedman, The
Case of the Woman with Two Husbands in Talmudic and Ancient Near
Eastern Law 15 ISR. L. REV. 530, 541 (1980) (arguing that “[i]n the
Mesopotamian Laws permission for remarriage depends upon considerations
of a utilitarian-economic nature, i.e. whether the woman can support herself
in her husband’s house, and not upon his presumed death; on the contrary, it
would seem that the Mesopotamian Laws take into account of the possibility
that the husband may still be alive, for in a case where the woman does not
suffer economic hardship, she remarries on pain of death.”).
178. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §133 (stating “[i]f a man is taken
prisoner in war, and there is sustenance in his house, but his wife leave house
and court, and go to another house: because this wife did not keep her court,
and went to another house, she shall be judicially condemned and thrown into
the water.”).
179. See Reynolds, supra note 57, at 25-6.
180. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §135.
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necessity.”181
Corresponding with a husband’s responsibility to provide for
his family was the right to control his family.182 This control was
not as extensive as the pater familias of the later Roman era, in
which a father’s control extended to whether his family members
lived or died.183 Nevertheless, a Mesopotamian man’s power over
his family was extensive: a father often could dictate the terms of
his children’s marriages; he could corporally punish his
children;184 and he could manage his wife’s dowry throughout her
life.185 A husband could even sell his wife and children into
temporary slavery to answer a debt.186 Hammurabi recognized the
nuances of debt, however, and the Code stated:
If a woman who lived in a man’s house made an agreement with her
husband, that no creditor can arrest her, and has given a document
therefor: if that man, before he married that woman, had a debt, the
creditor can not hold the woman for it. But if the woman, before she
entered the man’s house, had contracted a debt, her creditor can not
arrest her husband therefor.187
[But,] [i]f after the woman had entered the man’s house, both

181. See GORDON, supra note 54, at 12 (discussing THE CODE OF
HAMMURABI §134).
182. See SASSOON, supra note 6, at 66 (stating that The Code of
Hammurabi’s treatment of “the family as property was both image and law.
The law codified the fact of dependence and made it part of the fabric of
society.”); but see MIEROOP, supra note 18, at 119-20 (arguing that a
Mesopotamian king’s relationship with his people is akin to pater familias
role).
183. See Dykes, supra note 118, at 78 (stating that “[t]he Code knows
nothing of a patria potestas in the husband. There is no trace of his having at
any time the extensive powers, extending even to life and death, of the Roman
father over his wife and children. Indeed the severance of a wife from her own
family, and her incorporation in that of her husband is never complete and
irrevocable, for in certain cases she returns to her father’s house.”).
184. See e.g., THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §195 (stating “[i]f a son strike his
father, his hands shall be hewn off.”).
185. DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 272.
186. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §117 (stating “[i]f any one fail to meet a
claim for debt, and sell himself, his wife, his son, and daughter for money or
give them away to forced labor: they shall work for three years in the house of
the man who bought them, or the proprietor, and in the fourth year they shall
be set free.”); MATTHEWS & BENJAMIN, supra note 88, at 109 (edict can also be
found in Exodus 21:2-11 and Deuteronomy 15:12-18).
187. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §151. This section has been discussed in the
context of community property within marriage. Charles Sumner Lobingier,
The Marital Community: Its Origin and Diffusion: A Problem of Comparative
Law, 14 A.B.A. J. 211, 211 (1928). This law stands in contrast to English law,
under which “the husband was bound ‘afterwards to pay the debt [his wife
brings into the marriage], for he had adopted her and her circumstances.’”
Jenkins, supra note 7, at 336 (citing Blackstone, Bk. 1. Chap. 15. 111).
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contracted a debt, both must pay the merchant.188

Thus, the only scenario where wives and children were sold
into slavery was where an established household went into debt.
Finally, it is important to note that the Code only stepped in
when problems arose. Mesopotamian society would not have been
a going concern if dad kicked mom out of the house whenever she
caught a cold or sold her into slavery because the tip he got on that
horse did not pan out. Most Mesopotamians would not need a
Code to tell them these things. Moreover, if a wife chaffed at her
husband’s brand of patriarchic control or had second thoughts
about her marriage after a sojourn in debt servitude, she could
pursue the uphill course to divorce.
D. Providing for the Family in the Event of Divorce or Death
Marriages can be a source of more problems than they solve.
Moreover, one spouse typically dies before the other. The Code of
Hammurabi recognized these timeless truths and allowed for
divorce and, in the event of a spouse’s death, provided for the
surviving spouse.
The Code dictated that husbands and wives were unequal in
their ability to divorce.189 Notwithstanding the stigma associated
with divorce,190 a husband could generally divorce his wife at will
so long as he provided for her in their separation.191 The amount
he provided depended upon whether he was a freed man or
slave,192 whether there was a purchase price, and whether she had
children.193 The Code stated:
If a man wish to separate from a woman who has borne him
children, or from his wife who has borne him children: then he shall
give that wife her dowry, and a part of the usufruct or field, garden,
and property, so that she can rear her children. When she has
brought up her children, a portion of all that is given to the children,
equal as that of one son, shall be given to her. She may then marry
the man of her heart.194

188. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §152; Lobingier, supra note 187, at 211.
189. See Jenkins, supra note 7, at 336-37 (discussing conditions under
which men and women could obtain divorces within the Code of Hammurabi);
Dykes, supra note 118, at 78.
190. See NEMET-NEJAT, supra note 16, at 140 (arguing “[s]ocial stigma was
attached to divorce, therefore, it was not undertaken without grave cause,
such as adultery by the wife or a childless marriage.”).
191. As discussed, a husband could not divorce his wife if she were sick or if
she was sterile and provided him with a surrogate.
192. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §140 (stating “[i]f he be a freed man he
shall give her one-third of a mina of gold.”).
193. See id. §139 (stating “[i]f there was no purchase price he shall give her
one mina of gold as a gift of release.”).
194. Id. §137.
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If a man wishes to separate from his wife who has borne him no
children, he shall give her the amount of her purchase money and
the dowry which she brought from her father’s house, and let her
go.195

A husband could start a divorce simply with the words,
“Though art not my wife.”196 The Code also recognized constructive
divorce in the form of abandonment.197
A Mesopotamian wife faced a different burden to leave her
husband. A Mesopotamian woman “could obtain a divorce only
when she could prove to the judges that she had been careful and
was not at fault.”198 The Code stated:
If a man’s wife, who lives in his house, wishes to leave it, plunges
into debt, tries to ruin her house, neglects her husband, and is
judicially convicted: if her husband offer her release, she may go on
her way, and he gives her nothing as a gift of release. If her husband
does not wish to release her, and if he take another wife, she shall
remain as servant in her husband’s house.199

The Code also stated:
If a woman quarrel with her husband, and say: “You are not
congenial to me,” the reasons for her prejudice must be presented. If
she is guiltless, and there is no fault on her part, but he leaves and
neglects her, then no guilt attaches to this woman, she shall take
her dowry and go back to her father’s house.200
If she is not innocent, but leaves her husband, and ruins her house,
neglecting her husband, this woman shall be cast into the water.201

Thus, a woman could divorce and receive support only if she
had succumbed to her husband’s sexual demands,202 was fastidious
195. Id. §138.
196. Urch, supra note 8, at 440; see Reynolds, supra note 57, at 25.
(explaining that these words almost directly contrasted their vows at
marriage. See also POSTGATE, supra note 15, at 103 (finding “[o]ne form of the
words connected with marriage can be reconstructed fairly confidently:
legalizing a divorce requires the spoken formulae ‘You are not my husband’,
‘You are not my wife’—and these form the annulment of words quoted in a
wedding scene[:] . . . ’I will fill your lap with silver and gold: You are my wife, I
am your husband.’”); Yankwich, supra note 53, at 31-32 n. 65; NEMET-NEJAT,
supra note 16, at 135.
197. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §136 (stating “[i]f any one leave his
house, run away, and then his wife go to another house, if then he return, and
wishes to take his wife back: because he fled from his home and ran away, the
wife of this runaway shall not return to her husband.”).
198. CHAMBLIS, supra note 13, at 36.
199. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §141.
200. Id. §142.
201. Id. §143.
202. G.R. Driver and John C. Miles argue The Code of Hammurabi §§142
and 143 refer to a wife who is guilty of denying her husband’s conjugal rights.
See DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 299 (stating §§142-43 means that the
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with finances, was an impeccable homemaker, and proved her
virtues in court.
Presumably, a man could divorce his wife without cause
because he had the ability to work. As a result, he was unlikely to
fall into poverty and could support his ex-wife. Therefore, neither
spouse would burden the city-state. In contrast, a wife could only
divorce her husband for cause because a Mesopotamian woman
would likely be unable to support herself. Therefore, she would
likely fall into poverty and burden the city-state.203 Only if a
woman proved cause did Hammurabi give her the right to her exhusband’s support without any corresponding responsibility.
Moreover, a divorced woman was required to wait until her
children were grown before remarrying. Additionally, she was
required to return to her father’s house because Hammurabi did
not want a clever woman subverting her mandated responsibility
to fidelity by divorcing her husband for cause and marry another
man.
There were two economic resources within marriage: the
wife’s dowry and the husband’s estate. These resources were
security against life’s calamites, such as divorce or the death of a
spouse.204 The dowry was not a wedding gift for the husband.
Although a husband “managed” his wife’s dowry, he was bound by
a duty to preserve it.205 It served as security for whole family. If
there was a divorce, the woman received her dowry back as
support. If a wife died, the dowry supported the couple’s
children.206 If a wife died and there were no children, her widower
returned the dowry to his father-in-law, who would return the
bride price.207 Likewise, a husband’s estate was not just for his
wife has refused her husband conjugal rights). Thus, these two sections
anticipate a wife who did not provide her husband with a surrogate sexual
partner and neglected her sexual responsibilities because she was the victim
of abuse. It is unclear whether this situation arose when a husband or a wife
attempted to secure a divorce, or if it was its own claim.
203. See Jenkins, supra note 7, at 337 (arguing that The Code of
Hammurabi required husbands to provide for their ex-wives so that those
wives would not become a burden for the state).
204. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §171 (stating “[the] wife shall take her
dowry (from her father), and the gift that her husband gave her and deeded to
her (separate from dowry, or the purchase-money paid her father), and live in
the home of her husband: so long as she lives she shall use it, it shall not be
sold for money. Whatever she leaves shall belong to her children.”).
205. DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 272.
206. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §173 (stating “[i]f [a] woman bear sons
to her second husband, in the place to which she went, and then die, her
earlier and later sons shall divide the dowry between them.”); see id §174
(stating “[i]f she bear no sons to her second husband, the sons of her first
husband shall have the dowry.”).
207. Compare id. §162 (stating “[i]f a man marry a woman, and she bear
sons to him; if then this woman die, then shall her father have no claim on her
dowry; this belongs to her sons.”) with id. §163 (stating “[i]f a man marry a
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widow. Rather, the estate was for the widow and their children.
The Code mandated that widows would manage their deceased
husbands’ estates to support their children.208 Thus, the Code of
Hammurabi assigned rights and responsibilities among spouses
even after they were parted by death.209
IV. CONCLUSION
Hammurabi confronted problems concerning marriage and
issued edicts calculated to address those problems. The edicts
reflected a keen balancing of rights and responsibilities.
Nevertheless, the edicts also reflected assumptions about the roles
of spouses and purpose of marriage. The edicts do not make sense
unless one assumes that marriage is a sexual relationship with the
goal of producing children and providing for their needs. Likewise,
woman and she bear him no sons; if then this woman die, if the ‘purchase
price’ which he had paid into the house of his father-in-law is repaid to him,
her husband shall have no claim upon the dowry of this woman; it belongs to
her father’s house.”) with id. §164 (stating “[i]f his father-in-law do[es] not pay
back to him the amount of the ‘purchase price’ he may subtract the amount of
the ‘Purchase price’ from the dowry, and then pay the remainder to her
father’s house.”). See DRIVER & MILES, supra note 47, at 253 (suggesting that
the husband receives the “bride-price back” because he “has had the expense of
keeping a woman who has not done her part by providing him with sons.”).
208. See, e.g., THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §172 (stating “[i]f her husband
made her no gift, she shall be compensated for her gift, and she shall receive a
portion from the estate of her husband, equal to that of one child. If her sons
oppress her, to force her out of the house, the judge shall examine into the
matter, and if the sons are at fault the woman shall not leave her husband’s
house. If the woman desire to leave the house, she must leave to her sons the
gift which her husband gave her, but she may take the dowry of her father’s
house. Then she may marry the man of her heart.”); see id. §177 (stating “[i]f a
widow, whose children are not grown, wishes to enter another house
(remarry), she shall not enter it without the knowledge of the judge. If she
enter another house the judge shall examine the state of the house of her first
husband. Then the house of her first husband shall be entrusted to the second
husband and the woman herself as managers. And a record must be made
thereof. She shall keep the house in order, bring up the children, and not sell
the house-hold utensils.”); see also Jenkins, supra note 7, at 338 (arguing “[a]
widow became the trustee of the property of her deceased husband’s minor
children. She could not remarry without giving the judge an inventory and a
bond that the trust fund would be forthcoming at the proper time.”).
209. Although the Code’s jurisdiction extended to all of society, the dowries
and estates of commoners were not likely sufficient to support the absence of
an income. For example, the Code addressed the situation of a freed woman
marrying a slave. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §176 (stating “[i]f . . . a State
slave or the slave of a freed man marry a man’s daughter, and after he
marries her she bring a dowry from a father’s house, if then they both enjoy it
and found a household, and accumulate means, if then the slave die, then she
who was free born may take her dowry, and all that her husband and she had
earned; she shall divide them into two parts, one-half the master for the slave
shall take, and the other half shall the free-born woman take for her
children.”).
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the edicts do not make sense unless one assumes that spouses are
unequal in their abilities to access and manage resources.
Although his regulations were calibrated to address the problems
of his day, his assumptions reflect obsolete generalizations about
people and society. The lesson for policy makers is simple: history
judges equally decisions and presuppositions.
We are not burdened by many of the problems that weighed
on Hammurabi. Science displaced sexual fidelity as the sole means
for ensuring paternity and economic opportunities for women
destroyed the de facto need for a husband’s support. Nevertheless,
we are plagued by some of the problems that Hammurabi
addressed with marriage edicts.210 For example, children always
need to be nourished, nurtured, and educated. Hammurabi
dictated that parents, acting as a cooperating unit, fulfilled these
needs; whereas, policy makers today create laws for parental and
spousal support, welfare, and public education. Despite all of these
modern solutions, in 2010, 695,000 children in the United States
were maltreated.211
In 1905, Owen B. Jenkins lamented that the existence of the
Code of Hammurabi was a “revelation [that] humiliates one at the
slow progress of the race,”212 but “progress” presumes a
destination. In contrast to a source of humiliation, the Code of
Hammurabi provides solace. It demonstrates that some
solutions—like the rule of law and institution of marriage—are
dynamic and durable. For millennia, these solutions have
prevailed over other options because of their utility. Admittedly,
they are imperfect solutions. Part of their imperfection lies in their
temporal nature. Presuppositions change. Laws are amended or
become “dead letters.” The institution of marriage evolves.
Although the Code of Hammurabi is a “dead letter” and the
marriage norms of Mesopotamia are thankfully behind us, both
remind us that we are intimately linked with our predecessors and
progeny in a timeless march to apply our creative capacity to the
problems we face.

210. This is not to suggest that Hammurabi actually solved any problems
with his marriage edicts.
211. Child Maltreatment, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (CDC), (2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/cm_datasheet2012-a.pdf.
212. Jenkins, supra note 7, at 330.

